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Chapter 12
Profitable Prudence: The Case for Public
Employer Defined Benefit Plans
Gary W. Anderson and Keith Brainard
US public sector plans covering employees of state and local governments
have grown to comprise a substantial segment of national pension assets
and membership. Participants include more than 14 million workers—
10 percent of the national workforce—and six million retirees as well
as other annuitants; all are members of more than 2,000 retirement
systems sponsored by a state or local government (US Census 2002).
These systems have combined assets of more than $2 trillion and they
distributed over $110 billion in pension and other benefits (Board of
Governors 2004; US Census 2002); this volume exceeded the entire eco-
nomic output of twenty-two states and the District of Columbia (US Dept.
of Commerce 2003).
In recent years, public sector pensions have diverged from the private
sector pension trend, in that the percentage of public employees partici-
pating in a defined benefit (DB) plan has held steady at around 90
percent, while the fraction of private sector workers with a DB plan has
plummeted to around 20 percent (BLS 2002). Against the backdrop of
thirty years of private pension experience with the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, it is useful to note that US public
sector pensions evolved before, and outside the purview of, this federal
legislation. This different experience makes it invaluable to not only learn
what effects state and local government pensions have on stakeholders—
including participants, public sectors employers, and taxpayers—but
also to glean lessons that the public pension experience may offer to
private industry.
A Brief History of Public Pensions
Public DB plans have engaged in substantial efforts to reinvent themselves
in recent years, adding elements that increase their flexibility and portabil-
ity. Nevertheless, public plans retain the core attributes of a traditional DB
model: that is, the employer bears investment risk and the plan pays
lifelong benefits according to a specified formula. Against this backdrop,
it remains the case that each of the over 2,000 public retirement systems has
its own unique plan design, benefit structure, and governance arrange-
ment, set forth in a vast assortment of state constitutions, laws, and admin-
istrative rules. This mosaic of structures and features reflects each state’s
rich variety of legal, political, economic, and demographic cultures and
history, as well as its political subdivisions. In other words, state and local
government plans are creatures of state constitutional, statutory, and case
law. As such, public pensions are accountable to each state’s legislative and
executive branches, independent boards of trustees which often include
employee representatives and ex officio publicly elected officials, and
ultimately, the taxpayers of that jurisdiction.
Although some US public pensions date to the late Nineteenth century,
most public plans were established between the 1920s and 1940s. These
were mainly of the DB variety. Municipal governments led states and the
federal government in providing pension coverage for their workers,
largely because the first groups to be covered—police, firefighters, and
teachers—were established at the local level, by cities, towns, and school
districts. As Clark et al. (2003) point out, these plans were initially financed
from employee contributions, as a form of ‘forced saving plans,’ although
over time, employers gradually took on greater responsibility for plan
financing.
Because public employees initially had their own plans, the US Social
Security system initially excluded state and local government workers due
to uncertainty about whether the federal government could legally tax state
and local employers. In 1950, Congress amended the Social Security Act to
allow states to voluntarily provide Social Security coverage for their employ-
ees, if the state entered into an agreement with the Social Security Admin-
istration (Mitchell and Hustead 2001). Today, the majority of state and
local government employees participate in Social Security; the remaining
nonparticipants are teachers and public safety personnel though most
public employees in seven states do not participate (Alaska, Colorado,
Maine, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Nevada, and Ohio). Where employees
are exempt from social security contributions, the pension benefit and
contribution levels are typically higher.
The passage of ERISA and subsequent amendments were watershed
events in the evolution of private industry pensions, but these had little
impact on public pensions which remained largely untouched by federal
regulation. As Metz noted (1988: 4):
Governmental plans are specifically exempt from all of the substantive qualification
requirements added to the (Internal Revenue) Code by Title II of ERISA (with
the exception of the Section 415 maximum limitation on benefits), including
those relating directly to participation, vesting, funding, prohibited transactions,
joint and survivor annuities, plan merger and consolidation, alienation and
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assignment of plan benefits, payment of benefits, certain social security benefit
increases, and withdrawal of employee contributions. In addition, governmental
plans are exempt from ERISA’s other major provisions, including reporting and
disclosure requirements (Title I) and plan termination insurance (Title IV). Al-
though government plans are not subject to ERISA’s participation, vesting, funding
and fiduciary rules, they are, nonetheless, covered by comparable although
not as restrictive rules as stated in the Internal Revenue Code before ERISA’s
enactment.
In the private sector, ERISA’s impact was to impose a relatively uniform
and comprehensive set of regulations and standards to the pension sector;
by contrast, public retirement systems’ diverse nature would not be possible
if they had been governed in a like manner. This is not to say that the
federal government has not tried, as noted by the GFOA (1992):
Since passage of ERISA, in 1974 . . . Congress has deliberated over federal involve-
ment in the setting of conforming standards for state and local government retire-
ment systems. In 1978, the Pension Task Force Report, issued by the House
Committee on Education and Labor, recommended federal regulation of PERS.
Legislative proposals have been introduced in each successive Congress to establish
federal rules for state and local government retirement systems. However, during
this period PERS have made great strides in funding future pension obligations,
following prudent investment policies, disseminating information and implement-
ing administrative and operational discipline. These advances have been made
without the intervention of the federal government.
Public versus Private Sector Plan Differences
Since the passage of ERISA, the percentage of private sector workers with a
DB plan as their primary retirement benefit has fallen steadily, while
coverage has risen by defined contribution (DC) plans (primarily of the
401(k) variety). A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2003) study found
that only 58 percent of full-time private sector workers participated in an
employer-sponsored retirement plan, and only 10 percent of private
sector employers nationwide provided a DB plan. By contrast, virtually all
full-time public sector employees participate in a retirement plan, and the
vast majority (90 percent) is in a DB plan. Here benefits are usually
expressed as a percentage of salary for a designated period just before
retirement, multiplied by years of service credit (Findlay 1997).
What accounts for the divergence in pension coverage and type, when
comparing private industry and the public sector? Several reasons have
been offered for the loss of ground by DB plans in the private sector:
increased private-sector government regulation; changes in the private-
sector workplace, including growing employee and employer appreciation
of DC plans; changes in business awareness regarding risk associated with
funding DB plans; falling firmsize; greater global competition boosting the
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need for more flexibility in plan design; and successful marketing efforts of
consultants and DC plan service providers (Rajnes 2002).
Nevertheless, there are also less appealing consequences of relying on
DC plans as the primary retirement benefit (CBO 2003). For instance, DC
plans are seen as an unreliable vehicle for ensuring financial security in
retirement to the extent that investment risk is borne solely by individual
participants; this is exacerbated when plan participants are poor investors.
A study prepared for the Nebraska Public Employee Retirement System
(PERS) found that from 1983–99, that system’s DB plans generated an
average of 11 percent annually, but the system’s DC participants paid
returns of only 6 percent (Buck Consultants 2000). This occurred despite
ongoing efforts by the PERS to educate participants on the importance of
proper asset allocation. Nebraska PERS also found that a large percentage
of terminating DC participants cashed out their retirement saving rather
than retaining them in a retirement account. One explanation for why
public DC plan returns lag professionally invested DB portfolios is that the
DC asset allocations are often quite conservative. For instance, approxi-
mately half of all assets held in 403(b) and 457 plans (primarily and
exclusively used by public employees, respectively) were held in the form
of annuity reserves at life insurance companies (ICI 2004).
Another concern with DC plans as the primary retirement benefit is
termed the ‘leakage’ problem, a term applied to describe a variety of
circumstances when retirement assets are spent by plan participants before
retirement. For example, leakage occurs if an employee chooses to spend
his retirement assets after leaving a job, rather than rolling them over to an
Individual Retirement Account or to a new employer’s retirement plan.
Leakage also occurs when workers borrow against their retirement plan
assets and then fail to repay the loans. A recent study by Brainard (2003:7)
addressed the issue of leakage as follows:
A good example of terminating participants spending, rather than saving, their
retirement assets are in Nebraska, where state and county government employees
historically have participated in a DC plan. A study of the Nebraska Public Employ-
ees Retirement System, conducted by a national actuarial consultant, found that
68% of terminating participants cashed out their assets rather than rolling them
over to another retirement plan. This finding is consistent with a Hewitt Associates
study which found that more than two-thirds of participants terminating from DC
plans cash out their lump sum distributions rather than rolling them to other
retirement accounts.
In what follows, we outline the key advantages of DB plans to public
sector employees and employers, seeking to illustrate how this paradigm
for retirement provision is well-situated to meet retirement needs of the
future.
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Benefits to Employees
The ideal mix of retirement income sources has long been described as a
‘three-legged stool,’ with one leg each representing Social Security, an
employer pension, and individual savings. As a rule of thumb, financial
planners recommend replacing approximately 70–80 percent of one’s
working income in retirement. Public sector DB plans help achieve this
goal by linking employee salary and retirement income: thus a Social
Security–eligible employee retiring with twenty years of service in a typical
public pension plan can expect the benefit to replace 35–40 percent of his
salary. Combined with Social Security and personal saving, the retiree then
finds the 70–80 percent target within reach. Retirees and beneficiaries of
public DB plans received annual benefits of over $18,000 in fiscal year 2002
(Brainard 2004).1 In addition to the basic DB plan, many public employers
today also offer a voluntary, supplemental retirement saving plan which
enables workers to save on their own for retirement. The most popular
public employer-sponsored supplemental savings plans are 457 plans, also
known as deferred compensation plans, and 403(b) plans, commonly
referred to TSA’s or tax-sheltered annuities.
Retiree financial independence relies heavily on the guaranteed income
replacement concept provided by a DB plan, and it also relies on the
central concept that the retiree will continue to receive benefits until
death. Further, most public DB plans provide joint and survivor annuity
options, to ensure that spouses and other named beneficiaries will con-
tinue to receive a benefit even in the event of the death of the retiree
(Mitchell and Hustead 2001). By contrast, DC plans do not guarantee
access to a life annuity nor joint and survivor benefits.
A factor receiving increasing attention in recent years is the point that
public DB assets are held in trust for participants; the assets are normally
administered by a governing board whose members are legal fiduciaries.
Unlike private industry DB plans, which can be curtailed in the event of the
plan sponsor’s bankruptcy, public pension benefits generally cannot be
reduced. That is, ERISA protects only private sector DB benefits that have
already accrued, while it does not protect the right to future benefit
accruals. Constitutional provisions governing contract and property rights
are generally interpreted as protecting not only accrued benefits but also
future benefit accruals. This practice varies from state to state, with some
state constitutions explicitly protecting pension benefits, while in other
cases, statutes and case law expressly forbid cutting pension benefits. By
contrast, state and local laws generally afford participants far greater pro-
tections, prohibiting public employers from diminishing the benefit for-
mula, often with respect to future accruals. Another advantage of public
plans is that most provide some form of protection against inflation. Since
the median life expectancy of a 65-year-old woman is 22 years in the USA,
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inflation of just 2 percent will cut purchasing power by more than one-third
over the retirement period. Public plans offer several mechanisms for
adjusting benefits post-retirement, including with periodic adjustments
subject to legislative approval, automatic increases linked to the inflation
rate, and annual automatic increases of a flat percentage or dollar amount
(Brainard 2003).
Benefits to Employers
Pensions were introduced in the public sector to help public adminis-
trators attract and retain quality workers, to provide them with perform-
ance incentives, and to retire them in an orderly fashion (Eitelberg 1997).
It is worth recognizing that governments, in their dual roles as both
employers and policymakers, are uniquely situated to promote retirement
financial security and serve as models for private industry, in their capacity
as employer to more than one in ten working Americans.
The diversity of the public sector workforce has few, if any, peers in
private industry, and attracting and retaining such a workforce requires a
concerted and ongoing effort. For instance, just a few of the numerous
positions maintained by US public employers include game wardens and
garbage collectors, school teachers and environmental scientists, elected
officials and insurance analysts, psychiatrists and custodians, historians and
police officers, prison guards and firefighters, and college professors,
among others. Each of these positions requires a different set of skills,
knowledge, and abilities; exhibits differing demographic features and car-
eer patterns; and has unique requirements for recruitment, retention,
salary, and compensation. As Mitchell and Hustead (2001: 15) note:
One reason why pension plans differ (from those in private industry) is that they
cover employees with different employment characteristics. For instance, because
police work and fire fighting are physically demanding occupations, retirement
benefits for public safety workers typically allow retirement at earlier ages, in part to
maintain a younger workforce. Consequently, the retirement benefits available to
police and firefighters are usually different from those provided to teachers or
to general employees.
Similarly, pensions for judges typically are intended to reflect that, as a
group, judges are older than most other employees when entering their
positions, and they often forgo larger salaries in private industry to serve as
judges. Since protecting and educating its citizens is generally considered
to be a government’s core responsibilities, it should be no surprise that
more than half of all public employees work in positions classified by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002) as either Education or Protective
Service. More than nine million public employees are classified as educa-
tional (including teachers, administrators, and workers in supportive
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roles), and there are approximately one million law enforcement person-
nel and firefighters in the USA.
Not only do public DB plans attract a diverse group; they also promote
retention efforts by rewarding length of service. This is because DB plan
formulas usually base the retirement benefit on a worker’s salary during his
final years of service and on his length of service. Since salaries tend to rise
over time, DB plans typically calculate pension benefits based on the
worker’s final three or five years (final average salary or FAS). As the
workforce changes, all employers will be challenged to compensate workers
who possess required knowledge, skills, and institutional memory (see
Chapter 7). DB plans may be key to retaining quality employees.
DB plans also encourage orderly turnover of personnel by allowing
employees to depart from the workforce with a clear knowledge of their
pension benefits and with the assurance that the benefit payment will
continue for life. By contrast, the DC plan provides no assurance that an
employee will be financially prepared for retirement at any specific age or
level of experience. Unfortunately this uncertainty (or, in some cases,
certainty of the inadequacy of one’s benefits) causes employees to remain
on the job even when their ability to perform job duties is in decline.
Clearly this may also complicate the employer’s role, forcing decisions
with unpleasant consequences for everyone.
In recent years, public DB plans have grown more flexible in their ability
to meet a range of new employer (and employee) objectives. Developments
include shorter vesting periods; a majority of public employees now par-
ticipate in plans with a vesting period of five years or fewer, down from
ten years a decade ago. In addition, many large statewide public retirement
plans now allow participants to purchase service earned at another retire-
ment system or in the military. Also many plans now permit terminating
participants to take all or part of the employer contributions, and some
allow retired participants to return to active employment while continuing
to receive their pension benefits. The number of public sector hybrid
plans, having both DB and DC plan characteristics, has risen, as has
the number of plans permitting retiring participants to take a portion of
their benefit as a lump sum at retirement. Some plans also now permit
participants to share in investment earnings during the accumulation
period.
Another feature of DB plans particularly valuable to public employers is
their ability to help public employers temporarily adjust the criteria used to
determine retirement eligibility (typically, age and years of service require-
ments). Such incentives target employees who qualify already for retire-
ment or who are close to qualifying, many of whom may be older and have
more experience and salary than other employees. Once the worker retires,
his position can be held vacant temporarily or permanently, or he may be
replaced with lower-paid employee. Structured and managed properly,
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early retirement incentive plans have been deemed useful to public em-
ployers, especially in the short-term.
Public DB plans as Financial Engines
A not-yet-discussed beneficial aspect of public DB plans is that their assets
promote economic growth and vitality. Through their size, broad diversifi-
cation, and focus on long-term investment returns, public pension funds
stabilize and add liquidity toUS and foreign financialmarkets. The Board of
Governors (2004) reported that the $2.3 trillion held by public retirement
systems equaled over 20 percent of the nation’s entire gross domestic
product and approximately 20 percent of the nation’s total retirement
market. Public pension assets are well-diversified: approximately $1.3 tril-
lion of public pension assets are held as corporate equities; $800 billion is in
US treasury notes and bonds and corporate debt; and another $90 billion is
in real estate andmortgages (Board of Governors 2004).Most of these assets
are invested on a long-term basis, while public pension cash and short-term
holdings add essential liquidity to financial markets.
The cost of public pension funds to taxpayers, which is generally
reported as employer contributions was $38.8 billion (in FY 2002). Public
pensions paid over $110 billion in benefits in FY 2002, and a substantial
majority of these funds derived from sources other than employer (tax-
payer) contributions—mainly investment gains and employee contribu-
tions. Over the two-decade period from 1983 to 2002, public pensions
had total receipts of $2.7 trillion: investment earnings represented $1.65
trillion of all system receipts, dwarfing employer (government) and em-
ployee contributions (US Census Bureau 2003). Through professional
asset management and benefiting from favorable investment markets,
public funds leveraged contributions from employers and employees into
sizable investment earnings during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The sources of
public pension revenue are summarized in Figure 12-1.
It is worth noting that these revenue sources shifted dramatically be-
tween 1983 and 2002, with investment earnings ring from 42 percent in
1983 to 62 percent in 2002. Meanwhile, the employer (taxpayer) share of
cumulative public pension revenue declined from 42 percent to 26 per-
cent. Unlike DB plans in private industry, most public DB plan participants
contribute to their plans: 13 percent of public pension contributions came
from employees during this period, and investment earnings made up the
remainder. The time-series change in the distribution of revenue sources is
depicted graphically in Figure 12-2.
By sponsoring DB plans with professional investment functions, instead
of DC plans with assets managed by individual plan participants, public
employers increased the value of retirement plan assets by an amount
greater than the entire cost of their contributions during this same period.
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Investment earnings
$1.655 trillion
Employer
Contributions
$696 billion
Employee
Contributions
$336 billion
Figure 12-1. Sources of public pension revenue.
Source : US Census Bureau (2002).
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Figure 12-2. Changes over time in public pension fund revenue by source, 1983–
2002.
Source : US Census Bureau (2002).
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Venture capital provides financing for new and rapidly growing com-
panies; the innovations and efficiencies generated by start-up companies
are considered critical to long-term economic growth. In the last decade,
many public retirement systems have established target allocations to ven-
ture capital projects within their own state (PSRS/NTRS 2002). These
investments seek to provide a return to the pension fund commensurate
with the investment’s level of risk, and also to promote economic growth
and development in the state. Venture capital typically requires at least ten
years to fully mature, making it a natural match for DB assets (McDonald
2002). This is because of DB funds’ focus on long-term investment results
and because these funds pool assets for large numbers of participants,
accumulating portfolios large enough to commit to venture capital pro-
jects. In addition, DB plans also invest in other asset classes with the same
long-term focus they demonstrate with venture capital.
As consumers, retired pension participants spend their benefits on a
range of goods and services. These expenditures increase economic de-
mand and promote employment, generating additional economic activity,
which begets additional demand and employment. This is known as the
multiplier effect: the effect of a single dollar has an economic impact
greater than one dollar as it ripples through the economy. In an analysis
described in more detail in the Appendix, we estimate the impact of the
higher earnings from DB plans versus those available from DC plans which
take into account lower investment earnings. We evaluate the impact of
these higher investment gains on the gross product of the five states with
the largest public pension distributions in fiscal year 2002 (California, New
York, Texas, Ohio, and Illinois). In particular, we assume a marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) of 0.67, which implies an economic multi-
plier effect of 3.0. Benefit payments from these five states comprised
approximately 44 percent of the $110 billion in public pension benefit
payments in FY 2002. The difference between the actual benefits distrib-
uted by DB plans, and the estimated value of available DC benefits in these
states of $25.78 billion. represents the marginal value added by public DB
plans as a result of their investment returns over the inferred value of
available DC benefits (see Table 12-1).
Next we compute for each of the five states the value added to the gross
state product (GSP) by the higher payments from DB plans attributed to
superior investment returns. The value added, shown on Table 12-1, is
determined by multiplying the marginal value-added by public DB plans’
higher investment returns by the economic multiplier of 3.0. The table also
shows the percentage value added to each state’s gross state product, which
in these five states totaled a weighted average of 2 percent to states’ GSP. If
we were to extrapolate these computations to the entire economy, a na-
tional 2.0 percent impact would yield a value added from public DB plans of
$203 billion: $10.137 trillion (GDP) 2.0%¼ $203 billion. This contribution
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to the nation’s economy dwarfs the employer contributions of $39 billion
to public retirement systems in FY 2002. Indeed, setting aside all the other
benefits to employers and employees of DB plans, contributions to public
pension plans may be among the best investments a state or local govern-
ment can make.
Conclusions
The economic boost of public pension benefits is likely to grow as public
employees of the baby boomer cohort begin to retire, and public retire-
ment systems begin to pay out increasingly larger benefit amounts. In our
view, public pension plans are in a strong position to handle the coming
influx of retirees, since, unlike Social Security (mainly a pay-as-you-go
program); public pensions are rather well-funded (approximately 95 per-
cent in 2003). Investing the $2.3 trillion in public pension assets and the
flow of benefit payments to annuitants promises a continuous, predictable,
and growing source of economic stimulus. Moreover, through efficient
asset management and pooling of resources, public DB pension plans
have a significant, positive effect on financial markets and the economy.
In general, public employers recognize that DC plans have many positive
attributes, but to make them work well, many factors must fall into place:
participants must consistently make sound investment decisions over their
working and retired lives; they must remain in the workforce steadily,
avoiding lengthy time-off for having children, raising a family, completing
an education, or for illness; they must have a sufficient amount withheld
from their pay; they must avoid borrowing against and spending their
Table 12-1 Estimated Benefits from DB and DC Plans, Assuming Lower Returns
to DC Investments, 2002 (in $ billions)
State
Actual benefit
payments
made by
public DB
plans
Assumed
payments
from DC
plans
Value
added
by higher
DB plan
returns
2001
Gross
state
product
$ Value
Added to
Gross state
product by
higher returns
% Value
Added to
Gross state
product by
higher returns
California 14.88 6.20 8.68 1,359.27 26.05 1.9
New York 12.48 5.20 7.28 826.49 21.85 2.6
Texas 5.87 2.45 3.42 763.87 10.28 1.3
Ohio 5.62 2.34 3.28 373.71 9.85 2.6
Illinois 5.36 2.24 3.13 475.54 9.39 2.0
Total 44.21 18.43 25.78 3,798.88 77.42 2.0
Note : Columns may not add due to rounding.
Source : United States Dept of Commerce (2003).
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retirement assets; and they must make appropriate decisions regarding
withdrawal rates during retirement. Even then, employees might exhaust
their assets after retirement. Hence having a DB plan as the primary
retirement benefit protects public sector employees against many of these
problems.
Public DB pension plans have also enabled public employers to achieve
important objectives related to the recruitment and retention of quality
workers. These plans provide financial security in retirement and reduce
retiree reliance on public assistance programs. The fact that these plans
have evolved relatively independently of the federal regulatory structure
governing private pensions has allowed the public plans to engage in an
ongoing process of creating and modifying plan designs and governance
structures to meet the unique needs of public sector employers. The
independence, flexibility, and profitable prudence of these plans will con-
tinue to support public employers in their ongoing mission to serve tax-
payers, while providing financial security to retired public employees and
significant economic benefits to their communities. Public plans are, in-
deed, a useful component of the new retirement paradigm of the future.
Technical Appendix
Themultiplier effect described in the text is based on theMPC which refers
to the proportion of each additional dollar of household income used for
consumption. As Keynes (1936) noted, people tend to consume more if
their income rises, but this consumption gain tends to be less than the rise
in their income. The MPC states that a worker who receives an increase in
salary of $100 per month will spend some, but not all, of the entire $100;
savings and taxes will make up the difference. It can be expressed as a
formula: MPC ¼ DI MPS  t, which simply means that the marginal
propensity to consume equals the change in income minus savings minus
taxes. The multiplier effect can be derived from the MPC as 1/(1MPC).
To compare actual benefits paid by public DB pensions and the benefits
that might have been payable by DC plans earning lower assumed invest-
ment returns, we reduced by ten percent the amount paid by public DB
pensions to reflect migration of retired participants from the five states.
This reduces the DB payments figure to $44.2 billion. For the 20-year
period ended in 2002, public DB plans experienced annualized investment
returns of 10.03 percent. As a base of comparison, using the Nebraska
benefits adequacy study and the Investment Company Institute report on
the asset allocation of 403(b) and 457 plan participants as a guide, we
assume a net annualized investment return for DC plans during the same
period of 6.5 percent. Based on these rates, the DC plan portfolio would
have returned 41.7 percent of the investment gains accrued by the DB plan.
Applying this proportion—41.7 percent—of the investment earnings DC
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plans would have generated, to the benefits actually distributed by public
DB plans in the five states, yields $18.4 billion. This amount is referred to
here as the inferred value of available DC benefits, and represents a level of
assumed DC plan benefits that can be compared with the amount actually
distributed by DB plans.
While this exercise illustrates how public DB plans can have a positive
effect due to their superior investment returns, relative to DC plans, there
are other factors that must also be mentioned. For instance, we assumed
that DC plans would pay benefits in the same proportion to their invest-
ment earnings as DB plans, but in fact we cannot know at what rate DC plan
assets will actually be spent. Also we assumed that DC and DB contribution
rates would have been the same. In view of the fact that some DB contri-
butions over this period were actually intended to reduce underfunding, it
is possible that contributions to DC plans would have been lower than
these. In any event, our central finding—that DB contributions yield posi-
tive long-term economic results—suggests that higher contribution rates
literally have been a good investment, not only for taxpayers, but also for
public employers and employees. Additionally, this analysis assumed a
consistent contribution rate relative to investment gains and benefit pay-
ments, though actual contribution rates varied across states. Also we did
not attempt to determine additional tax revenues generated by higher DB
payments; rather we assumed that the DC and DB plans produced similar
rates of leakage, though most public DB plans do not permit loans. Finally,
we assumed that the administrative cost of the plan types is identical,
though public DB plans typically have administrative expenses consider-
ably lower than those of DC plans. Factoring this in would likely strengthen
the case for the economic value of DB versus DC plans.
Endnote
The authors wish to acknowledge the significant contributions made to this paper
by Cathie Eitelberg, Gary Johnson, Jeannine Markoe Raymond, Bill Wallace, and
Paul Zorn.
1. For the 25 percent of state and local government employees who do not partici-
pate in Social Security, pension benefits are generally higher to compensate for
the absence of Social Security benefits.
References
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors) (2004).
‘Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States First Quarter 2004’. Federal Reserve
System: New York.
Brainard, Keith (2003). Myths and Misperceptions of Defined Benefit and Defined Contri-
bution Plans. Denver: National Association of State Retirement Administrators.
218 Gary W. Anderson and Keith Brainard
—— (2004). Public Fund Survey. Denver: National Association of State Retirement
Administrators and National Council on Teacher Retirement.
Buck Consultants (2000). Benefit Review Study of the Nebraska Retirement Systems.
Denver: Buck Consultants.
Clark, Robert L., Lee A. Craig, and Jack W. Wilson (2003). A History of Public Sector
Pensions in the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2003). Baby Boomers’ Retirement Prospects: An
Overview. Washington, GPO.
Eitelberg, Cathie G. (1997). An Elected Official’s Guide to Public Retirement Plans.
Chicago, IL: Government Finance Officers Association.
Findlay, Gary (1997). ‘In Defense of the Defined Benefit Plan’, Government Finance
Review, Chicago: December.
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (1992). ‘Federal Regulation of
Public Employee Retirement Systems’, Public Policy Statements. Adopted June 23.
www.gfoa.org
Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2004). Fundamentals, 13(2), June.
Keynes, John Maynard (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.
Cambridge: Macmillan/Cambridge University Press.
McDonald, Ian (2002). ‘Fundholder’s Lament: All Bear, No Bull’,Wall Street Journal,
April 25, 2002.
Metz, Joseph G. (1998). The Taxation of Public Employee Retirement Systems. Chicago,
IL: Government Finance Officers Association.
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Edwin C. Hustead (eds.) (2001). Pensions in the Public Sector.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Public School Retirement System/Non-Teacher Retirement System of Missouri
(PSRS/NTRS). (2002). ‘2002 Summary of Findings’. Study by Missouri Venture
Capital Research Initiative, Jefferson City, MO. August, www.publicfundsurvey.org
Rajnes, David (2002). ‘An Evolving Pension System: Trends in Defined Benefit and
Defined Contribution Plans’. Washington, DC: Employee Benefits Research In-
stitute, September.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (USBLS) (2003). ‘2003 National Compen-
sation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States’.
Washington, DC: USBLS.
—— (2002). ‘2002 National Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates—Protective Service Occupations’, Washington, DC: USBLS.
United States Census Bureau (US Census) (2002). ‘Federal, State, and Local Gov-
ernments—State and Local Government Employee-Retirement Systems’.
Washington, DC: USBLS.
United States Department of Commerce (US Dept of Commerce), Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2003). ‘Regional Economic Accounts, 2001 Gross State Prod-
uct’, Washington, DC: USGPO.
12 / Profitable Prudence 219

